Professor of Philosophy
Boston University
I work on ethics, moral psychology, and nineteenth-century philosophy.
This interview from 2018 is a good introduction to my work and philosophical interests. You can find all of my research on the Books and Papers pages.
My latest book is Philosophy of Devotion: The Longing for Invulnerable Ideals. You can read the first chapter here. You can watch an interview about the book here.
Some of the main topics I've addressed are:
Fanaticism, extremism, and the moral psychology of devotion: my most recent book is Philosophy of Devotion: The Longing for Invulnerable Ideals. The book asks: why do people persist in commitments that threaten their happiness, security, and comfort? Why do some of our most central, identity-defining commitments resist the effects of critical reasoning and reflection? Drawing on real-life examples, empirical psychology, and philosophical reflection, I argue that these commitments involve an ethical stance called devotion, which plays a pervasive--but often hidden--role in human life. I argue that although devotion renders certain commitments immune to the effects of critical reflection, it is a stance we have reason to adopt. Yet devotion can easily go wrong, deforming into fanaticism. You can read more here.
If you want a shorter introduction to those topics, you could read "Fanaticism and Sacred Values"; it argues that fanaticism arises from a particular type of psychological and evaluative fragility. Another paper, "Fugitive Pleasure and the Meaningful Life," discusses Nietzsche's view on the connection between sacred values, nihilism, and happiness.
I've also done a lot of work on Nietzsche's ethics and philosophical psychology: if you want an introduction to my work on Nietzschean flourishing and my approach to moral psychology, you could check out this paper on self-conscious agency and this paper on Nietzsche's ethics.
In general, most of my work has focused on topics at the interface of ethics and philosophy of mind, including the way in which normative claims might be justified; the nature of self-consciousness; the nature of agency; the notion of drive; and the concepts of free agency and unified agency. I address these topics in part by mining the work of certain eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophers. I draw especially on the work of Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche, arguing that by appropriating and developing aspects of their accounts, we can gain insight into the above topics. As these remarks may indicate, I treat the history of philosophy not merely as a subject of antiquarian interest, but as a wellspring of ideas containing the resources to shape debates currently at the forefront of our field.
Boston University
I work on ethics, moral psychology, and nineteenth-century philosophy.
This interview from 2018 is a good introduction to my work and philosophical interests. You can find all of my research on the Books and Papers pages.
My latest book is Philosophy of Devotion: The Longing for Invulnerable Ideals. You can read the first chapter here. You can watch an interview about the book here.
Some of the main topics I've addressed are:
Fanaticism, extremism, and the moral psychology of devotion: my most recent book is Philosophy of Devotion: The Longing for Invulnerable Ideals. The book asks: why do people persist in commitments that threaten their happiness, security, and comfort? Why do some of our most central, identity-defining commitments resist the effects of critical reasoning and reflection? Drawing on real-life examples, empirical psychology, and philosophical reflection, I argue that these commitments involve an ethical stance called devotion, which plays a pervasive--but often hidden--role in human life. I argue that although devotion renders certain commitments immune to the effects of critical reflection, it is a stance we have reason to adopt. Yet devotion can easily go wrong, deforming into fanaticism. You can read more here.
If you want a shorter introduction to those topics, you could read "Fanaticism and Sacred Values"; it argues that fanaticism arises from a particular type of psychological and evaluative fragility. Another paper, "Fugitive Pleasure and the Meaningful Life," discusses Nietzsche's view on the connection between sacred values, nihilism, and happiness.
I've also done a lot of work on Nietzsche's ethics and philosophical psychology: if you want an introduction to my work on Nietzschean flourishing and my approach to moral psychology, you could check out this paper on self-conscious agency and this paper on Nietzsche's ethics.
In general, most of my work has focused on topics at the interface of ethics and philosophy of mind, including the way in which normative claims might be justified; the nature of self-consciousness; the nature of agency; the notion of drive; and the concepts of free agency and unified agency. I address these topics in part by mining the work of certain eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophers. I draw especially on the work of Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche, arguing that by appropriating and developing aspects of their accounts, we can gain insight into the above topics. As these remarks may indicate, I treat the history of philosophy not merely as a subject of antiquarian interest, but as a wellspring of ideas containing the resources to shape debates currently at the forefront of our field.